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D R A F T

SWHC Sub-Committee Special Studies and Evaluations

Problem

1. To determine the responsibilities and functions of a psychological warfare agency, taking into account the related functions and activities of other government agencies, with a view to recommending a suitable organization for the discharge of these functions in time of war.

Assumptions

2. It is assumed that:

- a. A National Security Council or a similar organization for closer and continuous <sup>high-level</sup> coordination on a high level (within the government) of our domestic, foreign and military policies will be established and will be composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Security, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and such other members as the President may designate from time to time. The National Security Council will be charged as an advisory body to the President with duties with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.
- b. The National Security Council or similar organization will be an extension of the existing Committee of Three and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.
- c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue with duties substantially as at present and will continue their existing status as the principal professional military advisers to the President and the Secretary of National Security.
- d. Active military aggression by <sup>the</sup> enemy or enemies will be initiated against the United States without a Declaration of War.
- e. ~~Active~~ Aggressive psychological "warfare" will be initiated against the United States <sup>both from outside and within</sup> prior to the beginning of active military aggression by the enemy or enemies.
- f. The time interval that may be available between the <sup>initial</sup> declaration of a state of emergency by the President and the beginning of war may be of

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the order of a few hours or a few months under most favorable conditions. The short time interval available for transitional activities will adversely affect the mobilization of facilities and personnel for "wartime" implementation of psychological "warfare" plans.

### Facts Bearing on the Problem

3. Government agencies involved during "wartime" in activities related to psychological "warfare":

a. The Executive and the executive agencies of the government are primarily involved in the conducting of psychological "warfare" operations.

b. The Legislative and Judiciary branches of the government and their supporting activities exercise checks and controls on the Executive branch.

c. <sup>The defense and foreign</sup> The State Department, the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Group are ~~at this time~~ <sup>charged with</sup> duties and responsibilities, and are functionally capable of contributing substantial support to a national psychological "warfare" effort.

4. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.) was established 30 April 1947 as the agency of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), charged with preparation of policies, plans and studies for immediate and continuous employment of national psychological warfare in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President). The Subcommittee shall have authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare, to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any war emergency which might arise.

5. ~~No~~ No national wartime organization for psychological warfare other than the SWNCC P.W.C. under the terms of SWNCC <sup>3044204/1</sup> ~~304172~~ has been established.

6. The Armed Services have been charged with responsibilities related to training, organization and equipping forces capable of employing psychological "warfare" methods, techniques and facilities. The Armed Services require policy and strategic guidance ~~as well as~~ <sup>to the</sup> to be apprised of the character and extent of contribution of effort in support of national psychological warfare effort.

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7. The State Department, the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Group operating within their current limitations of appropriated funds and allowed personnel are not in a position to make any substantial operational contribution to a national psychological "warfare" effort without a significant redeployment of personnel and other operating resources from current and projected operations.

8. The State Department has a functional organization capable of supporting, operationally, to a limited extent, the peacetime operations which are comparable to a national psychological warfare effort, but (recently enacted budget limitations) ~~will operate to reduce~~ the potential operational capabilities of this organization. *with a density*

9. The State Department, the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Group are at this time functionally organized to provide intelligence in support of preliminary pilot studies and ~~planning~~ planning.

10. In time of war the United States government needs to employ the intellectual-emotional instruments of power, psychological warfare included, at its disposal toward the accomplishment of national objectives.

11. In time of war duly approved plans and directives which are to be implemented in actual or projected military areas, theaters or commands will be implemented by the military theater commanders concerned.

12. In World Wars I and II the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations was adversely affected by procedural delays and deficiencies of integration and coordination in organization. Incident to the cessation of combat operations, demobilization and disestablishment of psychological warfare activities these problems and the lessons learned in World Wars I and II remain unresolved into an integrated and coordinated organization for psychological warfare in time of war.

13. The existing government agencies which are engaged in disseminating information to the people of the United States include: *and Affairs* Bureau of Public Information of the War and Navy Departments, the Division of Public Affairs of the State Department, Office of Public Information of the Army Air Forces and the Public Relations agencies of the various government departments.

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14 ~~14~~ <sup>14</sup> The Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs in the Department of State is charged with the performance of <sup>certain</sup> informational activities with relation to foreign countries ~~as set forth in the charter of that office.~~

15 ~~15~~ <sup>15</sup> In order to conduct psychological warfare effectively certain basic requirements must be fulfilled, which include:

- (1) Orientation with national policy;
- (2) Coordination with military, political and economic policy;
- (3) Formulation of psychological warfare plans and policies;
- (4) Conduct of psychological warfare operations which involves procurement and training of personnel, organizing and administering, procurement and distribution of supplies and equipment; evaluation and analysis of appropriate intelligence for the purpose of directing psychological warfare activities; preparation and distribution of psychological warfare material; constant evaluation of results.

16 ~~16~~ <sup>16</sup> The Army, Navy and State Departments do not have a Specialist Reserve Corps whose activities are clearly identified with psychological warfare <sup>designed to support a national</sup>

17 ~~17~~ <sup>17</sup> So-called "black" psychological warfare <sup>which</sup> involves activities in wartime which are related to the following:

- (1) Special type operations conducted by the Armed Forces, such as deception, demolition, behind-the-lines reconnaissance and patrolling, Commando type operations, and <sup>subversion</sup> intelligence activities.
- (2) Secret and subversive operations of the type performed by special OSS units in World War II.
- (3) Secret intelligence and counter-intelligence operations of <sup>e.g.</sup> ~~all intelligence agencies.~~
- (4) Specific employment of conventional weapons of war, such as air or naval attacks, for specific psychological warfare objectives.

## D I S C U S S I O N

18. The President may make, within his extant powers, a "declaration by the President of a state of emergency" without a public declaration and so enable limited psychological "warfare" operations in the interest of national security and national survival.

19. The phrase "or declaration by the President of a state of emergency" may be used as a time frame of reference for the separation of "wartime" organizational problems from "peacetime" organizational problems provided due consideration be given to the limitations embraced in the above and in the light of the changing situation.

20. The National Security Act of 1947 (S758), now before the Congress, was reported favorably to the Senate from the Committee on Armed Services. If the bill is enacted substantially in its present form the National Security Council will be the primary advisory body, to the Chief Executive on matters pertaining to the national security, replacing the informal Committee of Three, comprising the Secretaries of State, War and Navy now performing this function. Since the national security involves the integration of military, political, and economic policy, it therefore appears essential that there be the closest and most intimate connection between the direction of psychological warfare and the National Security Council.

21. The report of the Committee of the Senate on Armed Services is quoted: "World War II crowned the American effort with overwhelming success. At the same time, the projection of this vast effort into almost every field of civil and governmental endeavor disclosed certain fundamental weaknesses in our security structure which should be remedied while their details are fresh in mind. For instance, our slow and costly mobilization, our limited intelligence of the designs and capacities of our enemies, our incomplete integration of political purpose and military objective, and finally, our prodigal use of resources, all demonstrate convincingly that our national existence would be imperiled were we to ignore the costly lessons of war and fail to recognize our national security structure so as to prevent the recurrence of these defects.

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"In looking to the future, it is apparent, from the potentialities implicit in scientific developments, that the world is entering an era in which war, if it comes, will be fought at speeds and accompanied by devastations that stagger the imagination! Consequently, in order at once to guard our safety and support our efforts to promote and maintain the peace of the world, it is essential that this country move without delay to provide itself with the best organization for security which can be devised."

2.8. The translation of national policy into the overall strategic plans for military, political, economic and psychological warfare operations requires complete coordination, to avoid conflicting processes or objectives, and to insure that the total resources are employed to a furtherance of the national objective. The balance of effort as between these several operations is dependent upon the changing situation. In general, the military will take precedence in securing desired coordination whenever plans involve American lives.

2.9. The formulation of psychological warfare plans and policies in accordance with national policy and in coordination with military, political and economic planning, requires the existence of a policy and planning body which to be effective must be under the authority and direction of a single responsible head. It is considered that the individual so charged will report directly to the National Security Council, and to the President. This policy and planning body must include representatives of State Department, Armed Forces, Central Intelligence Agency, who are qualified to participate both as individuals and representatives of their respective organizations.

2.10. In time of emergency there is an inevitable tendency towards the creation of new government agencies to deal with each new problem that arises. Since the field of interest and activity pertaining to psychological warfare is extremely broad, this tendency must not be permitted to prevent the close coordination of effort required. This danger can be averted only by the carefully planned organization of an executive agency with power to act. Coordination of planning and implementation is not sufficient. Many of the

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specialist activities involved are common to the needs of the State, War, and Navy Departments. Some are foreign to the peacetime or wartime capabilities of these and other departments. These specialist techniques and operations include the following:

- a. Expert analysis of psychological vulnerabilities of enemy peoples, or segments of enemy populations, based on intimate knowledge of enemy cultural, historical, economic, and military life.
  - b. Expert determination of means of reaching the psychological targets.
  - c. Analysis of enemy psychological warfare activities and determination of means to counter such activities.
  - d. Technical capabilities in the fields of translation, propagation, presentation. There can be no more dismal failure than inept propaganda.
  - e. Techniques of appraising mass human reaction. The requirements cannot be met by accumulating, on the one hand, a collection of "long-hairs" psychiatrists, psychologists, anthropologists, etc., nor, on the other, by mobilizing the advertising profession. The field is still new, these specialist qualifications and techniques are necessary, even more necessary is imaginative creativeness combined with a broad comprehension of all related means of warfare. On the whole, these requirements cannot be met adequately in any one of the services of departments. If, for no other reason than the above, it appears essential that a separate agency be planned for, prepared for, and expeditiously established in time of emergency. It is the clear intent of SNOC that such an agency should exist in war or threat of war. The foregoing is, however, illustrative of the magnitude of the organizational problems to be overcome.
- ✓ 11. In order to overcome any of these problems it would seem to be absolutely essential that the individual selected by the President to assume the overall responsibilities for psychological warfare should be the chief of any top-level policy and planning group as well as the titular and actual head of the organization charged with the functional responsibilities outlined above.

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Even with this asset there are difficult organizational problems still to be met. There can be an organization in Washington, within the framework of relationships outlined herein that can function smoothly and efficiently as an entity, wherein clear horizontal divisions of responsibilities can be established and a clear vertical channels of responsibility established. This simplicity and clarity, so essential to efficient operations, is more difficult to achieve in theatres of operations, wherein the military commander is solely responsible for psychological warfare operations. In the past war the solution to this problem varied from theatre to theatre—in some it was never solved. A constant obstacle to a consistent and reasonable solution has always been the combined impact of over-enthusiasm for and reactionary non-acceptance of the value of psychological warfare. The present JCS have indicated their awareness of psychological warfare. There would appear to be no longer any necessity for "selling" psychological warfare as a part of our task. The reasonable workable arrangements which in some instances were developed are adaptable to our future problem. No organizational solution however can replace the essential requirement for the "right man in the right place". Our solution is predicated upon this assumption.

20 12. It is impossible to anticipate what government agencies may be created for what purposes, but it is the opinion of the Subcommittee that its plan for organization must leave no gaps in respect to the essential functions involved. It has been indicated that the employment of "black" psychological warfare in the last war was in large part dependent upon the existence of OSS. We consider, however, that since the functions of OSS have been absorbed by CIG and other agencies, that these responsibilities can be discharged in the future, and should be, with existing agencies in collaboration with the organization for psychological warfare contemplated.

21 13. The task of overcoming the enemy's will to resist is inseparable from that of maintaining at a high level our own will to victory. These two tasks do in fact represent the offensive and defensive objectives towards the

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attainment of which psychological warfare makes its essential contribution. These offensive and defensive aspects require close integration to ensure that progress towards one objective is not at the expense of the other. The idea of propaganda for home consumption is, however, repugnant to most Americans. On the other hand, even the voluntary censorship of news agencies results in wartime in something less than a free press. In effect government agencies become the primary, if not the only source of releasable news. The selection and timing of releases has always to be balanced against security considerations. In other words, it is at least in part a psychological warfare problem. Another essential consideration is the fact that the weapons of psychological warfare are not discriminate. A broadcast beamed in any direction may sooner or later, in one form or another return to its source. It would appear therefore that insofar as directed and planned psychological warfare is concerned (as contrasted to routine public relations) unity of guidance, direction and control is absolutely required.

28 ~~14.~~ In the event the continental U.S. or a part thereof became a zone of combat it is to be expected that psychological warfare activities within such zone would be the responsibility of the commander. The national psychological warfare organization would function in the normal way, i.e., by providing facilities, personnel, material, and expert assistance and advice. In any event there will be organization within the U.S. for purposes of civil and internal defense. It is impossible to predict the nature and extent of responsibilities of various existing agencies for these purposes. It is contemplated however that the relationship between the psychological warfare organization and such agencies would be similar to that between it and theater commands.

29 ~~15.~~ It is impossible to consider organizational structure without some understanding of the personnel problems involved. Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department have a specialists reserve in their organized reserve corps made up of personnel with a background in psychological warfare.

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The State Department does not have a reserve of civilian personnel who were formerly members of OWI and similar organizations.<sup>30</sup> The problem arises of the differences in status, pay, and training of personnel in uniform and those in a civilian status who are involved with the same organization and the same type of work.

~~26~~ 26. In our country the precedence has been established for the harmonious working together of both civil and military agencies in a common enterprise. The organization of a psychological warfare agency should be flexible enough to permit the continuing of these relationships. However, in the theatres of operation there is a consideration whether or not a military status is desirable. It should be possible to arrange a temporary status to govern such contingencies.

31 ~~27~~ 27. It must be pointed out that the Subcommittee does not regard the psychological warfare organization as an all-embracing colossus in the field of morale. National morale, and the esprit de corps of any organization, are alike the responsibility of leadership, a responsibility upon which the psychological warfare organization must not infringe.

#### C O N C L U S I O N S

32 18. In the event of war or threat of war as determined by a declaration of an emergency by the President, a National Psychological Warfare Organization should be established in the Executive Branch of the government.

33 19. The National Psychological Warfare Organization should be under the single control and direction of a Director appointed by the President from military or civil life and be responsible to the National Security Council.

34 20. The Director of the National Psychological Warfare Organization should be the Chairman, with power of decision, of a Planning and Policy Board upon which should sit representatives of the departments of the Armed Forces, the Department of State and such other government agencies whose participation may be found necessary or desirable.

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35 21. The National Psychological Warfare Organization will plan, develop, and execute all phases of the Federal Program of Radio, press, publications, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information, and all other foreign propaganda activities, in time of war, or threat of war as determined by the President.

36 22. The National Psychological Warfare Organization will in time of war be charged with all phases of planning, development, control, and coordination of all psychological warfare activities both domestic and foreign and with the coordination therewith of all domestic and foreign information policies of the U. S. Government.

37 23. The global strategic nature of psychological warfare will necessitate centralized policy control of all domestic and overseas information agencies.

38 24. The National Psychological Warfare Organization will have access to and be provided with government intelligence and will have made available to it from the monitoring and analysis agencies foreign information which it may require in the furtherance of its assigned functions.

39 25. Within established theatres of operations or similar organizations within the continental U.S. the military commanders should be responsible for the implementation of psychological warfare plans and directives formulated by the National Psychological Warfare Organization.

40 26. A specialist reserve corps should be established within the Army and Navy Reserve Corps.

41 27. The Department of State should maintain files on trained civilian personnel now on duty with the Office of International Information and Cultural Relations and those who were on duty with World War II psychological warfare organizations. <sup>42</sup> All National Psychological Warfare Organization personnel employed in the theatre of operations should be under military control and should be given <sup>the</sup> responsibility, status, and privileges of military personnel.

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R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

43 ~~44~~ 28. It is recommended that:

- a. The conclusions above should be accepted for planning purposes.
- b. The War and Navy Departments be requested to consider a specialist reserve corps in the Army and Navy Reserve Corps.
- c. The Department of State be requested to maintain files on experienced civilian personnel for this activity.

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